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sions will soon need to approach zero to 
ensure that warming stays below 1.5 °C, 
unless so-called negative emission tech-
nologies that withdraw carbon from 
the atmosphere are widely deployed. 
Unsurprisingly, the feasibility of the 
1.5 °C target is a contentious issue at the 
interface between science and policy.[2] It 
distracts from the core challenge which 
requires policy action, rather than tar-
gets, to take center stage. Otherwise, the 
door to ambitious climate change miti-
gation rapidly closes.
Although there has long been a call 
for a 1.5 °C safeguard, especially from 
vulnerable small island states and devel-
oping countries,[3,4] its inclusion in the 
UN Paris agreement came as surprise 
to many, given the heated debate about 
the feasibility of the 2 °C target in the 
run-up to the meeting.[5–8] To support 
its intent, the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has asked the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to produce 
a Special Report on “the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C 
above preindustrial levels and related global greenhouse gas 
emission pathways” by 2018.[1]
In terms of climate impacts, there is little doubt that 1.5 °C 
would be a more desirable target than 2 °C, as it would limit 
long-term sea level rise and the risk of crossing unknown 
climate-related thresholds. Some impacts, such as decreasing 
crop productivity and water availability, threaten to be 
substantial even at 1.5 °C warming.[9] Additionally, for some 
low-lying areas and sensitive ecosystems, limiting the global 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C may be their last chance of 
survival.[3] However, there are risks and trade-offs with other 
sustainability objectives inherent in the mitigation technologies 
required to meet the target. Examples include the effects of 
large scale deployment of bioenergy and the conflict with food 
production, or nuclear power causing severe environmental 
accidents.[10,11] The investigation and realization of definitive 
and desirable action in the short-term deserves priority.
2. The Biophysical Budget Constraint
Climate models indicate that the relationship between a tem-
perature target and the residual carbon capacity of the atmos-
phere (carbon budget) is roughly linear.[12] Figure 1 shows 
these budgets, compared to historical emissions, for different 
1. Introduction
The “Paris Agreement” took effect in November 2016, less than 
a year after the landmark deal was reached at the United Nations 
(UN) Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015. The target 
of limiting global temperature increase to “well below 2 °C […] 
and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C 
above preindustrial levels”[1] is ambitious. Greenhouse gas emis-
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
At the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015 ambitious 
targets for responding to the threat of climate change have been set: limiting 
global temperature increase to “well below 2 °C […] and to pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C”. However, calculating the CO2 
budget for 1.5 °C, it becomes clear that there is nearly no room left for future 
emissions. Scenarios suggest that negative emission technologies will play 
an even more important role for 1.5 °C than they already play for 2 °C. Espe-
cially against this background the feasibility of the target(s) is hotly debated, 
but this debate does not initiate the next steps that are urgently needed.  
Already the negotiations have featured the move from targets to implemen-
tation which is needed in the coming decade. Most importantly, there is an 
urgent need to develop and implement instruments that incentivize the rapid 
decarbonization. Moreover, it needs to be worked out how to link the climate 
and development agenda and prevent a buildup of coal power causing lock-in 
effects. Short term entry points into climate policy should now be in the focus 
instead of the fruitless debate on the feasibility of targets.
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likelihoods of achieving the 1.5 or 2 °C targets. It demonstrates 
that, in order to have a likely chance (>66%) of staying below 
1.5 °C, a total of only 200 GtCO2 can be released from 2016 
onward.[12,13] This exactly represents the emissions of the period 
2011–2015, and means that at current rates, the carbon budget 
for 1.5 °C will be exhausted in five years. It seems likely that to 
achieve the 1.5 °C target, almost all CO2 emissions currently 
being released will need to be removed from the atmosphere in 
the future. This implies that wind and solar energy alone will 
not be enough, as at best, these technologies can reach zero 
emissions.
Achieving the 2 °C target with a likely chance is somewhat 
less demanding; the remaining budget of 800 GtCO2 allows 
the energy system to be transformed without relying on large-
scale negative emissions. However, Figure 1 shows that a large 
proportion of the CO2 budget would be absorbed by 2030 if 
each nation implemented its plans, as outlined in the Intended 
National Determined Contributions (INDCs) presented in 
Paris.[14] Unless the INDCs are tightened, large volumes of 
emissions will also need to be eliminated by carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR) technologies. This simple budget calculation 
highlights that political action contradicts political ambition. 
This is true for the 2 °C and, in particular, the 1.5 °C target.
3. Transformation Requirements
While negative emissions are important for the 2 °C target, 
for 1.5 °C they become indispensable.[15] Such negative emis-
sions can be achieved either by combining low-carbon bioen-
ergy generation with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) or 
through net land-use changes.[16] BECCS in particular, with its 
large-scale application of bioenergy, has a considerable land 
footprint; taking the median amount of BECCS used in 
IPCC 2 °C scenarios, Smith et al.[17] estimate that 380–700 Mha 
would be needed to cultivate the biomass needed. This 
requires trade-offs with, and risks to other land-based activities 
(e.g., ref. [18–21, 22]). Smith et al.[17] compare BECCS to other 
CDR technologies such as Direct Air Capture and Enhanced 
Weathering and find that all conceivable options experience 
drawbacks in terms of land, energy, or costs. Given the CO2 
budget constraint, these technologies will all need to be consid-
ered in the overall mitigation strategy.
By establishing the 1.5 °C goal, policymakers have bet on the 
large-scale availability of negative emissions technologies that 
could lead to substantial trade-offs between climate change mit-
igation and other sustainable development goals.[23] The more 
the action to achieve this goal is delayed, the more the reliance 
on negative emissions to achieving it increases.
However, the debate around negative emissions is futile if the 
more obvious measures are not implemented first, as it might 
distract from other important technological requirements for the 
zero-carbon transformation. The IPCC clarified that transforma-
tion pathways consistent with 2 °C warming rely on both negative 
emissions and on unprecedented implementation rates of low-
carbon technologies, such as renewables and nuclear energy. They 
are also characterized by substantial improvements in energy 
efficiency.[18] All these requirements are particularly crucial for 
the 1.5 °C target, as the tiny remaining carbon budget leaves no 
room to further delay strong global climate policy, abstaining from 
some mitigation technologies or continue development with high 
energy demand.[15,18,24]
4. Political Feasibility and Ways Forward
Technoeconomic scenarios on climate mitigation clearly dem-
onstrate the need for rapid decarbonization, but lack plausible 
political narratives.[25] They remain mostly silent on policy 
instruments and on the political and distributional implications 
between and within countries related to such a fundamental 
transformation of the world economy. The challenge now lies 
in finding ways to bridge the gap between political ambition 
and political action. The two most important issues that need to 
be addressed by both research and policymakers are: (i) ways to 
foster investment in sustainable infrastructure to avoid a lock-
in to emission intensive infrastructure, especially coal power; 
and (ii) the development of sufficient and implementable trans-
formative policy instruments.
4.1. Sustainable Infrastructure Investments
Infrastructure choices made today will determine carbon emis-
sions in the future. The continued use of existing and new 
infrastructure as currently planned, contrasts dramatically with 
climate goals (e.g., ref. [26,27]). One of the most prominent 
and crucial examples is that of coal-fired power plants. Coal is 
currently so cheap that it has, again, become the most impor-
tant source of energy-related emissions on the global scale.[28] 
Coal resources and reserves are abundant[29] and the world is 
experiencing a new buildup of coal in many emerging econo-
mies.[28,30] Once coal power plants are built, there is a consid-
erable lock-in to carbon-intensive infrastructure that could 
inevitably consume large parts of the remaining CO2 budget.[31] 
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Figure 1. Historic emissions (1870–2010 and 2011–2015) and the total 
remaining CO2 budget (2016 onward) for different likelihoods of staying 
below 1.5 and 2 °C within the 21st century. For comparison, the cumula-
tive budget absorbed by the Intended Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (INDCs) up to 2030 is given. Source: Historic emissions: IPCC[44] 
and Le Quéré et al.;[43] Budget: IPCC;[12] INDCs: UNFCCC.[14] Figure: own 
representation.







Introducing a price on CO2 emissions could be an important 
contribution in determining the correct relative price of coal 
and with it, avoiding lock-in. However, in developing coun-
tries, economic growth is the key to bringing people out of pov-
erty, and some governments, such as those in India, Vietnam, 
and South Africa, rely on coal for growth. Therefore, the det-
rimental effect of carbon prices on poor households needs to 
be understood. One proposal is to use the revenues generated 
from carbon pricing to either reduce other taxes,[32] or invest in 
infrastructure for the provision of basic needs such as access 
to water or sanitation.[33] Future research will be required to 
explore the opportunities – and barriers – for each country to 
the implementation of carbon pricing.
4.2. Transformative Policy Instruments and Energy 
Demand Options
Transitions to low-carbon economies can be achieved by 
applying different energy supply policies. These include putting 
a price on emissions, and implementing technology policies 
that include nonprice regulation, such as efficiency standards, 
regulation, or targeted R&D policies at different stages of inno-
vation.[34] However, there is currently a lack of systematic assess-
ment not only in terms of subsequent evidence-based analysis 
of different policy instruments, but also of their political feasi-
bility and impact of their distribution within each country.
Furthermore, as energy demand options are neglected in 
most technoeconomic model scenarios,[35] many policy options 
are systematically ignored. Energy demand and location-spe-
cific solutions are likely to be required to achieve sector-specific 
targets, as has been shown for the transport sector.[36] Lifestyle 
changes, such as diet shifts from meat to vegetarian,[37] can pos-
sibly outperform technological solutions in mitigating emis-
sions in the agricultural sector.[38] Creutzig et al.[39] show that 
both infrastructure provision and nonmonetary incentives 
emerge as crucial components of comprehensive climate poli-
cies, in addition to carbon pricing.
It is the task of innovative research to determine prom-
ising policy portfolios for climate change mitigation at global, 
national, and local scales. However, these tremendous changes 
cannot be driven by research or policymakers alone. Addition-
ally, it needs initiatives by industry and business to stimulate 
the required transformation.
5. Conclusion
While the 1.5 °C target establishes a limit for what constitutes 
“dangerous climate change,” the CO2 budget for this target is 
almost exhausted; the attainability of the 1.5 °C target is in jeop-
ardy. The political move toward 1.5 °C highlights the extremely 
tight budgetary constraints for achieving such a target and pre-
empts a similar debate surrounding the 2 °C target. The contro-
versial discussions on negative emissions are not new, but the 
growing attention in the political and public arena helps raise 
awareness on the divergence of action and ambition of this 
topic. With a rising focus on solutions, this awareness should 
translate into immediate action.[40]
Rapid decarbonization can be achieved with simultaneous 
investments in renewable energy technologies, energy demand 
solutions, and negative emission technologies. We urgently 
need to work out how to link the climate and development 
agenda and prevent a buildup of coal power causing lock-in 
effects and consuming the remaining carbon budget. We know 
what to do. Now, we need to find a way to do it.
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